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T

he New Hampshire primary is scheduled to
take place on Tuesday, February 11, and numerous polls have told us and are telling us what
the voters are contemplating “if the election were held
today.” In interpreting what the polls mean for the
actual primary election, however, we need to take into
consideration several caveats.
1. Voters are mostly undecided, even close to
election day.
The polls typically ask respondents how they would
vote if the election were held immediately, and most
poll respondents will give some name. But that
response doesn’t mean they are committed: typically,
leading up to the election anywhere between half and
three quarters of voters are still trying to decide whom
to choose. Thus, last-minute swings in support are possible and quite common.
For example, two months before the 2012 primary,
59 percent of Republican voters were unsure whom to
vote for; the Sunday before 29 percent were still unsure.
Two months before the 2016 primary, 55 percent of
Republicans and 45 percent of Democrats were undecided, and in the mid-October 2019 CNN/University of
New Hampshire (UNH) poll 57 percent of Democrats
were undecided. (Likely because there is not, as yet, a
competitive Republican primary, only 28 percent of likely
Republican primary voters were undecided, and the great
majority said they would vote for President Trump.)
2. Even “decided” primary voters can change their
minds at the last minute—because there are no
party differences among candidates.
In a general election contest, voters’ preferences are
highly influenced by their party affiliation. Even voters
who know little about the candidates can still rely on
the candidate’s party as an indicator of whom to choose.
But in a primary contest, there is no party difference
to anchor voter preferences, and if policy differences
are slight the voter might vote for one candidate just as

easily as another. Thus, last-minute ads, news stories,
and campaign activities that suddenly favor one candidate over another can cause a major swing in voter
preferences in a short time. Hillary Clinton trailed
Barack Obama by an average of 8 percentage points
in polls finishing Sunday before the 2008 primary, but
a good debate performance on Saturday night and
continuing news coverage of a “humanizing” incident at
a Portsmouth coffee shop helped her sway last-minute
voters and pull out a surprising 2 percentage point win.
3. Pollsters’ predictions of voter turnout are fraught
with problems that can distort results.
Unlike most states, New Hampshire allows any resident
of voting age to participate in the primary, even if they
are not previously registered,1 and anywhere from 10
to 15 percent of a New Hampshire primary electorate
consists of people who register to vote at the polls on
Election Day. Many pollsters use past primary voting
lists as their source for sampling potential respondents,
but that approach would exclude the “walk-in” voters,
who could be demographically and politically quite
different from the rest of the voters—thus resulting in
misleading poll results.
4. Final pre-election polls in the New Hampshire
primary have often been right—but have just as
often been wrong.
Because of the factors mentioned above, the accuracy
of polling in the New Hampshire primary has been
inconsistent. In 2008, the polls did an excellent job
predicting the Republican winner (John McCain),
but they were all wrong predicting the Democratic
winner (Hillary Clinton). Indeed, in every primary
election from 1968 through 2000, the polling in New
Hampshire differed significantly from the final results.
The major problem is that the polls typically stop
two to three days before the election and therefore
don’t catch changes that occur right before people vote.
Exit polls (taken as voters leave the voting booths)
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have consistently shown that one-third or more of New
Hampshire voters made up their minds in the last three
days before the election, and one in six made up their
minds on Election Day itself.
Given these caveats, it’s prudent to take a skeptical
look at what the polls are showing us. They measure
voters’ top-of-mind reactions to the candidates, but
with no guarantee that the voters will retain those
views as the election approaches.
5. The impact of only one competitive primary.
Voters in New Hampshire can register as Democrats,
Republicans, or undeclared. The 42 percent of registered voters in this last group are, unfortunately, often
referred to by media and New Hampshire politicos as
“independents.” Most of them are not.
In fact, when the undeclared are asked if they lean
toward either of the two major parties, most admit they
do, with only about 10 percent of the electorate saying
they do not lean to either party. Research shows that
those who lean toward a party tend to vote the same way
as those who are registered with that party. The undeclared voters who do not lean to a party are the least
likely to vote.
With President Trump not facing a serious challenger
so far in 2020, many in the media have wondered how
the “independents” (or undeclared voters) might impact
the Democratic primary. According to state laws, on
primary election day undeclared voters can choose to
vote in either the Republican or Democratic primary.
(Voters registered as either Republicans or Democrats
can choose to vote only in their party’s primary.)
Might many undeclared voters, even those who lean
Republican, choose to participate in the Democratic
primary? If so, how much of an impact could these socalled independents have on the outcome?
The short answer is: probably not much. Over
time, most undeclared voters tend to vote only in one
party’s primary or another; very few choose to vote in
a Republican primary one time and in a Democratic
primary the next. Even though there is little competition in the GOP primary this time around, the vast
majority of undeclared voters who lean Republican will
either vote in their party’s primary or not vote at all.
And most of the undeclared voters who do not lean to
either party will not vote.
Still, research shows that a small number of primary
voters—about 3 percent—do switch parties from one

election to another, depending on which primary seems
to be more competitive. In very close contests, as the
one in 2020 appears to be (as of this writing), it is possible that the results in the Democratic primary could
be affected by undeclared voters, some of whom might
be Republicans. So far, in New Hampshire’s history, the
undeclared voters have not determined the outcome in
a primary, but pollsters need to be aware that the past is
no guarantee of the future. They need to measure what
undeclared voters intend to do.
6. The Iowa effect.
One thing to keep in mind is that the Iowa caucuses
just eight days before the New Hampshire primary can
upend candidate standings in New Hampshire and render irrelevant any polls taken prior to the Iowa contest.
But unfortunately for pundits, the “Iowa effect” is not
always predictable.
For Republicans, recent history suggests the Iowa
results have little effect on a candidate’s standing in New
Hampshire. Such was the case for George W. Bush in
2000, who won Iowa but lost big to John McCain in New
Hampshire. Similarly, neither Mike Huckabee (2008),
Rick Santorum (2012), nor Ted Cruz (2016) saw any boost
in their New Hampshire standings after winning in Iowa.
However, not-so-recent history provides a different
lesson. In 1980, for example, George H.W. Bush was
initially helped in New Hampshire by winning in Iowa,
as was Bob Dole in 1988. In 1996, Pat Buchanan was
helped by his second-place showing in Iowa.
One explanation for the lack of an Iowa effect on
New Hampshire for Republican candidates in recent
times is that the electorates in the two states are different.
Exit polls in 2008, 2012, and 2016, for example, showed
that about 12 percent to 17 percent of Iowa caucus voters
considered themselves “moderate” or “liberal,” compared with 45 percent and 47 percent of New Hampshire
primary voters in 2008 and 2012 but just 29 percent in
2016. More importantly, the percentage of evangelical
Republicans voting in Iowa is almost three times greater
than in New Hampshire: 57 percent versus 22 percent in
2012, and 64 percent versus 22 percent in 2016.
While history gives us a mixed message about the
effect of Iowa on New Hampshire for Republicans, a
good showing in Iowa for Democrats typically helps
the candidate in New Hampshire. That was the case
for Obama in 2008, John Kerry in 2004, Richard
Gephardt and Paul Simon in 1988, Gary Hart in 1984,
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and Jimmy Carter in 1980 and 1976. The good showings in Iowa did not always translate into victories in
New Hampshire (for example, Obama, Gephardt, and
Simon), but they did give the candidates a boost.
In contrast with Republicans, the ideological profiles
of Democratic voters in Iowa and New Hampshire are
similar: In 2016, the last competitive cycle, exit polls
showed Iowa with liberals outnumbering moderates/conservatives by 78 percent to 22 percent; in New Hampshire
the comparable figures were 68 percent to 32 percent.
Given these data, one could speculate that, for
Democrats, a victory in Iowa would give the winner
a boost in New Hampshire. Still, even that pattern
may be upset this year because of the large amounts
of money available to candidates and because of the
unusually large number of candidates. The screening
process could be much slower this year, with wellfunded candidates able to continue their campaigns
even if they lose in several of the early contests.
As for current polls predicting the winners in New
Hampshire, history suggests considerable caution. As
Yogi Berra might remind us if he were a cable news
commentator, “It ain’t over till it’s over.”
The Carsey Perspectives series gives authors the opportunity to
present their analysis of important topics that is not based on
original data analysis.
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